At the 24 February meeting, the EU urged Israel to allow more aid into Gaza, stop West Bank settlements, and respect Syria’s territorial integrity. But – surprise – Israel promptly did the very opposite. So what was the Association Council for? If the EU wants to be taken seriously, it must use its leverage.
11 March 2025
By Martin Konecny
At the EU-Israel Association Council held on 24 February, the EU presented Israel with a comprehensive statement, agreed upon by all 27 member states, conveying its political positions on the situation in the region and on bilateral relations.
The meeting, held amid a faltering ceasefire in Gaza and a major Israeli escalation in the West Bank, was chaired by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Israeli foreign minister Gideon Sa’ar. Unusually, almost all EU foreign ministers were present. The EU’s statement, negotiated for over a month, included some 30 pressing EU concerns and appeals to Israel.
Among them, the EU called for “full and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid to the Gaza strip” and insisted on the “full implementation” of the Gaza ceasefire. Yet, just days after the meeting, Israel blocked all humanitarian aid into Gaza, thus violating the ceasefire terms, followed by cutting off electricity.
The EU also reaffirmed “its strong opposition to Israel’s settlement policy” in the West Bank, urging Israel “to halt continued settlement expansion and related activities” including demolitions of Palestinian structures. Yet since the Association Council, Israel further stepped up its weekly approvals of new settlement housing units: 1,170 units on 26 February, 1,408 units on 5 March, and a record 1,439 units expected on 12 March. In a first, Israel also demolished Palestinian homes in Jerusalem during Ramadan, breaking from a years-long practice of pausing such demolitions during the Holy Month.
The EU also asserted that Syria’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders must be fully respected, in accordance with international law”, called on Israel “to uphold the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement” and stressed that “the demilitarized buffer zone [seized by Israel in December] must be respected”. Yet, days after the meeting, Israel conducted a wave of airstrikes and ground raids in southern Syria while its leaders threatened to push further into Syria by instructing the IDF to “prepare to defend” a Druze suburb of Damascus.
In sum, the result of the Association Council is that Israel has done the exact opposite of what the EU pleaded for. This raises a question: will the EU do anything? And if not, what was the whole Association Council for? The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and the Association Council is the highest political platform for bilateral dialogue. The EU had been discussing and preparing the Association Council for nine months since EU foreign ministers called for it in May 2024.
The idea came up in reaction to the Spanish-Irish request to review Israel’s compliance with the human rights clause of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, allowing for its potential suspension in response to the carnage in Gaza. Other member states opposed this, arguing instead for dialogue through the Association Council to “convey our positions and concerns”.
This argument was deeply unserious. It should have been evident that merely raising concerns would have no effect. At the previous Association Council with Israel in 2022, the EU also called for a halt to settlements, demolitions, and settler violence – yet all have only accelerated since then.
Israel ignores EU positions because it knows there are no consequences. While the EU’s statement at the latest Association Council raised numerous concerns, it also extensively praised its close trade and research ties with Israel, pledging to continue them – signalling business as usual despite Israel’s devastating actions. A table we have compiled illustrates this disconnect, listing the EU’s political concerns and appeals on one side and the praise for bilateral relations on the other.
If the EU wants Israel to take its concerns seriously, it has to start linking the two sides of the table.
And if the EU – or at least a coalition of willing member states – does not want the Association Council to be completely disregarded, they should now push for robust follow-up. For start, they should evaluate Israel’s response, within a month of the meeting. If Israel has not addressed EU concerns – or has made the situation even worse, as is already evident – they should press for consequences.
Since dialogue has proven ineffective, they should refocus on the Spanish-Irish proposal to invoke the human rights clause under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.
As a reminder, Article 2 says the agreement is “based on respect for human rights and democratic principles”, which is an “essential element”. A serious breach of Article 2 allows the EU to take “appropriate measures” under Article 79 – a diplomatic term for suspending parts or all of the agreement.
This is not theoretical. Since the 1990s, the EU has invoked similar human rights clauses in agreements with third countries at least 25 times, mostly in Africa, to impose such measures.
The EU remains divided on Israel. But a simple majority of member states could take the first step: request the European Commission to propose a partial suspension of the Association Agreement. This alone would make Israel take EU positions more seriously.
The trade part of the agreement, which grants Israel preferential access to the EU market, is the bloc’s main source of leverage. A Commission proposal for suspending the trade pillar would then require approval by a qualified majority of member states (unlike suspending the full agreement, which would require unanimity).
Member states seeking to advance this approach can point to the EU’s Association Council statement, where Article 2 was explicitly emphasised in paragraph 3 – whereas in 2022, it was only mentioned in paragraph 32.
They can also reference the internal EU compilation of UN and international court assessments, prepared last year by EU human rights envoy Olof Skoog, which can serve as evidence of Israel’s grave breaches of Article 2.
Given EU divisions and the current wild geopolitical context, all of this is a tall order. But if the EU wants to be relevant – and prevent the worst-case scenarios of annexation and ethnic cleansing – this is the direction to take.